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SOLOMONOFF PREDICTION AND OCCAM’S RAZOR
TOM F. STERKENBURG
Abstract. Algorithmic information theory gives an idealized notion of com-
pressibility, that is often presented as an objective measure of simplicity. It
is suggested at times that Solomonoff prediction, or algorithmic information
theory in a predictive setting, can deliver an argument to justify Occam’s ra-
zor. This paper explicates the relevant argument, and, by converting it into a
Bayesian framework, reveals why it has no such justificatory force. The sup-
posed simplicity concept is better perceived as a specific inductive assumption,
the assumption of effectiveness. It is this assumption that is the characterizing
element of Solomonoff prediction, and wherein its philosophical interest lies.
1. Introduction
Occam’s razor is the principle in science that tells us to prefer the simplest avail-
able hypothesis that fits the data. As a pragmatic principle, it might strike one as
obvious; but it is often interpreted in a stronger fashion. As an epistemic principle,
Occam’s razor comes with a promise that a preference for simpler hypotheses is
somehow more likely to lead us to the truth. This raises the difficult question of
how to ground such a promise, thus to justify the epistemic principle. Still prior to
this is the nontrivial problem of how to actually measure simplicity.
Algorithmic information theory, also known as Kolmogorov complexity after Kol-
mogorov (1965), is sometimes believed to offer us a general and objective measure
of simplicity. The idea is that a data object, like the specification of a hypothesis,
is simpler as it is more compressible, meaning that we can capture it in a shorter
description. With the aid of the theory of computability this idea can be made
formally precise, culminating in the definition of a data object’s Kolmogorov com-
plexity as the length of its shortest description. In the standard textbook on the
subject, we read:
This gives an objective and absolute definition of ‘simplicity’ as ‘low
Kolmogorov complexity.’ Consequently, one obtains an objective
and absolute version of the classic maxim of William of Ockham.
(Li and Vita´nyi, 2008, 260)
But this is not all. The first variant of Kolmogorov complexity to appear in
the literature, by the hand of R.J. Solomonoff (1960; 1964), was part of a theory
of prediction. Solomonoff’s central achievement was the definition of an idealized
Date: September 13, 2016.
This is a preprint of the article in Philosophy of Science 83(4): 459-479 (October 2016). For
valuable feedback on several versions and presentations of this paper, I am indebted to Peter
Gru¨nwald, Jan-Willem Romeijn, the members of the Groningen PCCP seminar, Simon Huttegger,
Hannes Leitgeb, Samuel Fletcher, Filippo Massari, Teddy Seidenfeld, and an anonymous referee.
This research was supported by NWO Vici project 639.073.904.
1
2 TOM F. STERKENBURG
method of prediction that employs this complexity measure to give greater proba-
bility to simpler extrapolations of past data. Moreover, Solomonoff (1978) was able
to formally prove that this prediction method is reliable in the sense that it will
generally lead us to the truth.
Here emerges an argument that is suggested in many writings on the subject. The
argument concludes from (1) the definition of a type of predictor with a preference
for simplicity and (2) a proof that predictors of this type are reliable that (per
Occam’s razor) a preference for simplicity will generally lead us to the truth. Thus,
remarkably, it is an argument to justify Occam’s razor.
In this paper, I will consider this argument in detail. The conclusion will be that
it does not succeed. I reach this conclusion by employing a specific representation
theorem to translate the argument in terms of Bayesian prediction. This transla-
tion reveals that the apparent simplicity bias is better understood as a particular
inductive assumption, that by a basic property of Bayesian prediction methods en-
tails reliability under that very same assumption – leaving the conclusion of the
argument without justificatory force.
The main positive contribution of this paper is the observation that – rather than
simplicity – it is the assumption or constraint of effectiveness that is the central
element of Solomonoff’s theory of prediction. This can serve as the starting point
for a more careful philosophical appraisal of Solomonoff’s theory. While numerous
substantial claims about the theory’s philosophical merits have been advanced from
the angle of theoretical computer science, attention in the philosophical literature
has so far been largely restricted to the occasional mention in overview works.
This is unfortunate. Not only can the theory be seen as the progenitor to multiple
successful modern approaches in statistics and machine learning, including universal
prediction or prediction with expert advice (see Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi, 2006) and
the principle of minimum description length (see Rissanen, 1989; Gru¨nwald, 2007);
the theory itself originated as a branch of a major philosophical project – namely,
Carnap’s early programme of inductive logic, pursued with tools from information
theory and computability theory. In this capacity the theory brings together a
diverse range of motifs from the philosophy of induction, that in turn connect the
theory to several other approaches: among those we find formal learning theory (see
Kelly, 1996), that likewise puts effectiveness centre stage, and the project of meta-
induction (Schurz, 2008), the philosophical counterpart to prediction with expert
advice. The broader aim of the current paper is to convey this to the reader.
Overview. The plan is as follows. I start in Section 2 with covering some essential
preliminaries on sequential prediction and effectiveness. In Section 3, I present the
details of the argument to justify Occam’s razor. Section 4 introduces Bayesian
prediction. Section 5, that forms the philosophical heart of the paper, is devoted to
a representation theorem that bridges Solomonoff’s predictors and Bayesian predic-
tion. In Section 6, I employ this representation theorem to translate the argument in
terms of Bayesian prediction, thereby revealing the hidden assumptions and show-
ing why the argument fails to deliver a justification of Occam’s razor. I conclude
in Section 7.1
1This paper concerns the justification of Occam’s razor in the approach to predictive inference
based on algorithmic information theory, the approach invented by Solomonoff. It is important to
note that I make no claims here about other approaches to statistical inference in the field (like
the Kolmogorov structure function, see Vita´nyi, 2005), and that my observations certainly have
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2. Setting the Stage
In this section, I introduce the minimal amount of terminology and notation
that we will be needing in this paper. Subsection 2.1 covers sequential prediction;
Subsection 2.2 covers computability and effectiveness.
2.1. Sequential prediction. We consider sequential prediction of binary digits
(bits), elements of the set B := {0, 1}. Having witnessed a finite sequence σ of bits,
we are to make a probability forecast, based on σ only, of what bit comes next;
then this bit is revealed, and the procedure is repeated. Dawid (1984) names it the
prequential approach, for sequential prediction in a probabilistic fashion.
Sources and predictors. A probabilistic source represents a random bit generating
process. It is a function that returns for every finite sequence of outcomes the
probability that this sequence is generated. Hence, it is a function S : B∗ → [0, 1]
on the set B∗ := ∪t∈NBt of all finite outcome sequences such that, first, the initial
probability equals 1: so S() = 1 for the empty sequence ; and, second, it fulfills
a condition of compatibility: for all sequences σ, the summed probability of both
one-bit extensions of σ equals the probability of σ: so S(σ0) + S(σ1) = S(σ).
A basic example of a probabilistic source is the Bernoulli source with parameter
p, that corresponds to the process of repeatedly generating a bit with the same
probability p of outcome 1. The special case of the Bernoulli source corresponding
to the process of repeatedly generating a bit with both outcomes having equal
probability is given by S(σ) := 2−|σ|, where |σ| denotes the length of sequence σ.
Another example is a deterministic source that just generates (say) the real number
pi in binary: it is defined by S(σ) = 1 for all those σ that are initial segments of
the binary development of pi; and S(σ) = 0 for all other sequences.
A prediction method or simply predictor is a function that returns for every finite
sequence of outcomes a specific prediction. A prediction can be a single element 0 or
1; but we take it more generally as a probability distribution over both possibilities.
Thus, a predictor is a function P : B∗ → PB, with PB the class of all probability
distributions over 0 and 1.
As an example, analogous to the Bernoulli source, one can define a predictor that
always returns the probability distribution assigning probability p to outcome 1.
Another example is the “maximum likelihood” predictor that returns for sequence
σ the probability distribution that assigns to outcome 1 the relative frequency of
1’s in σ.
As suggested by the Bernoulli example, a probabilistic source determines in a
straightforward way a predictor, and vice versa. So, importantly, we can treat
no direct bearing on approaches that are for large part only inspired by algorithmic information
theory, like the minimum description length principle. While Rissanen (1989) acknowledges that
his “main source of inspiration in developing the MDL principle for general statistical problems
has been the theory of algorithmic complexity [algorithmic information theory],” he is quick to
add that “the role of the algorithmic complexity theory is inspirational, only, for almost everything
about it, such as the idea of a model and even the very notion of complexity, must be altered to
make the ideas practicable” (ibid., 10). Two relevant ways in which the theory is fundamentally
different are that the notion of complexity in the MDL approach pertains to hypothesis classes or
models (so that the resulting simplicity bias is akin to that in the Bayes factor method, see Kass
and Raftery, 1995), rather than to data sequences or single hypotheses as in Solomonoff’s theory
(Gru¨nwald, 2007, 31); and that effectiveness plays no fundamental part, whereas this is the key
ingredient in Solomonoff’s theory.
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predictors and probabilistic sources as formally interchangeable objects. In all of
the following, I will use the term “probabilistic source” in an interpretation-neutral
way, to simply refer to a function with the above formal properties. That way, it
makes sense to define a probabilistic source and then interpret it as a predictor.
Whenever I intend the interpretation of a probabilistic source as giving the objective
probabilities or chances in a random process, I will make this more explicit by
talking about a data-generating probabilistic source.2
Risk of a predictor. To evaluate the anticipated performance of a predictor, we need
a notion of expected prediction error. We take the expectation according to some
presupposed actual data-generating probabilistic source S∗.
For the specification of prediction error, we have the choice of various functions of
the error (or loss) of a prediction with respect to an actual outcome. Let us fix as our
loss function the customary function in the area, the logarithmic loss; from this loss
function we then obtain a specific measure Rt(S
∗, P ) of expected prediction error
or simply risk of predictor P for the t-th prediction.3 By summing the risks over all
instances t ∈ N, we have a specification of the total risk R(S∗, P ) :=∑t Rt(S∗, P ).
2.2. Computability and effectiveness. This subsection introduces the basic no-
tions from the theory of computability that we require in our setting of sequential
prediction.4
Turing machines and computability. A Turing machine represents a particular al-
gorithm, or computer program. We need not be concerned here with the formal
definition: think of a Turing machine M as a black box that when presented with
a bit sequence ρ for input, starts calculating, and either halts at some point (pro-
ducing a bit sequence σ for output: we write M(ρ) = σ) or goes on calculating
forever.
The generally accepted Church-Turing Thesis states that every possible algo-
rithm corresponds to some Turing machine.
If a Turing machine represents a particular computer program, a universal Tur-
ing machine represents a general-purpose computer. A machine of this kind is called
universal because it can emulate every other Turing machine. The reason that we
can define such a machine is that it is possible to enumerate a list {Mi}i∈N of all
Turing machines in a calculable way, meaning that there is an algorithm that given
2For clarity of presentation, I have taken some amount of liberty in simplifying notions and
notation. Perhaps the most significant technical aspect that I ignore in the main text is that the
notion of probabilistic source is actually understood in a somewhat weaker sense. Namely, only
the inequalities S() ≤ 1 and S(σ0) + S(σ1) ≤ S(σ) for all σ are required of a source S: such a
source is called a semimeasure in the algorithmic information theory literature (as opposed to a
measure that satisfies the equalities). Also see footnote 10.
3The logarithmic loss of a prediction giving probability p to actual outcome b is− log2 p. For the
agreeable properties of the logarithmic loss function in “pure inference,” see Bernardo and Smith
(1994, 69-81); Merhav and Feder (1998, 2127-28). The resulting risk function is the Kullback-
Leibler divergence or relative entropy, that has an interpretation as the quantity of information
lost when estimating with the one source rather than the other. Nothing in our discussion hinges
on this interpretation, and indeed not much hinges on the particular risk function: the relevant
Theorems 2 and 4 below (at least for sources that are measures) continue to hold for other standard
risk functions, like the mean squared error. See Solomonoff (1978, 426-27); Li and Vita´nyi (2008,
352-55).
4For a much fuller treatment of the theory of computability in the context of algorithmic
information theory, see Nies (2009); Downey and Hirschfeldt (2010).
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an index j reconstructs the j-th Turing machine from this list. A universal machine
U implements such an algorithm: given as input sequence the concatenation of a
code sequence 〈j〉 for Mj and a sequence ρ, it will reconstruct Mj and calculate
Mj(ρ). In symbols, U(〈i〉ρ) = Mi(ρ) for all i ∈ N, ρ ∈ B∗.
The Church-Turing Thesis is therefore equivalent to the statement that every-
thing that is calculable is calculable by a universal Turing machine. I shall reserve
the term computable for the formal property of being calculable by a universal Tur-
ing machine. Then a more economical formulation of the Church-Turing Thesis
reads: everything that is calculable is computable.
Effectiveness. Let D stand for an arbitrary but countable set of elements. If D is
not B∗, I will still simply write M(d) and speak of machine M with input d ∈ D,
where it is actually more proper to write M(〈d〉) and speak of M with input some
code sequence 〈d〉 ∈ B∗ for d. This is possible because the elements of a countable
set D can always be encoded by finite bit sequences.
Call a function f : D → D′ computable if there exists a Turing machine M that
represents it: M(d) = f(d) for all d ∈ D. This definition applies to integer- and
rational-valued functions. A real -valued function f : D → R we call computable if
some Turing machine can approximate its values up to arbitrary level of precision:
there is some computable rational-valued function g : D × N → Q such that the
difference |f(d)−g(d, k)| < 1/k for all k ∈ N. A somewhat weaker requirement than
full computability is semicomputability. Call a function f semicomputable (from
below) if some universal machine can compute ever closer lower approximations
to its values (without revealing how close). That is, for such f there exists a
computable g : D × N → Q with the property that for all d ∈ D and all s ∈ N we
have that g(d, s) ≤ g(d, s+ 1) and lims→∞ g(d, s) = f(d).
I shall treat semicomputability as the minimal level of calculability, and from
this point on use the term effective for any function that satisfies it. Note that,
since they are functions on bit sequences, we can directly apply this requirement
to probabilistic sources, and hence predictors.
Indeed, one might consider it a most basic requirement on what would still count
as a predictor that it provides probability assessments that are at least in principle
approximable by our means of calculation. With the Church-Turing Thesis, this
means that the class of possible predictors should be restricted to the effective
ones as defined above. This is a philosophical point that I shall return to in the
concluding Section 7.
Conversely, we shall accept that any effective predictor does represent a possible
method of prediction. We must do so, if we are to grant that Solomonoff’s predictor
below indeed represents a method of prediction, or the argument is discredited from
the start.
3. The Argument to Justify Occam’s Razor
Li and Vita´nyi (2008, 347-48) write,
It is widely believed that the better a theory compresses the data
concerning some phenomenon under investigation, the better we
have learned and generalized, and the better the theory predicts
unknown data, following the Occam’s razor paradigm about sim-
plicity. This belief is vindicated in practice but apparently has not
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been rigorously proved before. . . . We . . . show that compression
is almost always the best strategy . . . in prediction methods in the
style of R.J. Solomonoff.
The general form of the argument that we can distill from these words is as
follows. First, we identify a class Q of predictors that have a distinctive preference
for simplicity (predictors “following the Occam’s razor paradigm”). Here I mean
“distinctive” to convey that predictors outside Q do not possess such a simplicity
bias. Second, we prove that these predictors are reliable (“almost always the best
strategy”)5. Taken together, the two steps establish a connection between two
seemingly distinct properties of a predictor: a preference for simplicity on the one
hand, and a general reliability on the other. More precisely, the two steps together
yield the statement that if a predictor possesses a simplicity bias, then it is reliable.
Equivalently, predictors that possess a simplicity bias are reliable.
In short, the argument is as follows:
1. predictors in class Q possess a distinctive simplicity bias
2. predictors in class Q are reliable
∴ predictors that possess a simplicity bias are reliable
Occam’s razor, in our setting of sequential prediction, is the principle that a
predictor should possess a simplicity bias. The conclusion of the above argument
provides an epistemic justification for the principle of Occam’s razor, so stated. A
predictor should possess a simplicity bias because if it does, it is reliable.6
We now need to make precise the two steps of the argument, including the
relevant notions of simplicity and reliability. I discuss the explication of step 1 in
Subsection 3.1, and that of step 2 in Subsection 3.2. I revisit the complete argument
in Subsection 3.3.
3.1. Step 1: The predictor. A monotone machine is a particular kind of Turing
machine that can be seen to execute an “on-line” operation: in the course of pro-
cessing a continuous stream of input bits it produces a potentially infinite stream of
output bits. Formally, such a machine M has the property that for any extension ρ′
of any input sequence ρ (we write ρ 4 ρ′), if M yields an output on ρ′ at all, it yields
an output M(ρ′) that is also an extension of M(ρ) (so M(ρ) 4M(ρ′)). The mono-
tone machine model suffers no loss of generality in what can be computed: every
function calculable by a standard Turing machine is calculable by some monotone
machine. The reason why this machine model is central to the theory is that the
monotonicity property allows us to directly infer from each monotone machine a
particular probabilistic source. We now proceed to do so for a universal monotone
machine.
So suppose we have some universal monotone machine U , and suppose we feed it
random bits for input: we repeatedly present it a 0 or a 1 with equal probability 0.5.
For any sequence ρ, the probability that we in this way end up giving the machine
5This phrasing suggests a weaker property than reliability (i.e., convergence to the truth),
namely optimality (convergence to predictions that are at least as good as those of any other
prediction method). However, the proof that is referred to is about reliability.
6Note that the proposed justification only asserts that a simplicity bias is sufficient for relia-
bility. One might feel that a true justification should also include the necessity of a simplicity bias
for reliability: only the predictors in Q are reliable. It is possible to revise the argument to yield
the stronger statement. However, for ease of presentation I will here stick to the former argument.
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a sequence starting with ρ only depends on the length |ρ|: this probability is 2−|ρ|.
Having processed ρ, the machine will have produced some output sequence. For a
sequence σ of any length that starts this output sequence, we can say that input ρ
has served as an instruction for U to produce σ. For this reason we call sequence
ρ a U -description of σ.
We can now ask the question: if we feed machine U random bits, what is the
probability that it will return the sequence σ? In other words: if we generate
random bits, what is the probability that we arrive at some U -description of given
σ? This probability is given by Solomonoff’s algorithmic probabilistic source.
Definition 1 (Solomonoff 1964). The algorithmic probabilistic source QU : B∗ →
[0, 1] via universal monotone Turing machine U is given by
QU (σ) :=
∑
ρ∈DU,σ
2−|ρ|,
with DU,σ the set of minimal U -descriptions of σ, i.e., the set of sequences ρ such
that U(ρ) < σ and not U(ρ′) < σ for any shorter sequence ρ′ ≺ ρ.
We see that a sequence σ receives greater algorithmic probability QU (σ) as it
has shorter descriptions ρ. The accompanying intuition is that σ receives greater
algorithmic probability as it is more compressible. If we further accept this measure
of compressibility as a general measure of simplicity of finite data sequences, then
we can say that a sequence receives greater algorithmic probability as it is simpler.
By the formal equivalence of probabilistic sources and predictors (Subsection
2.1), we can reinterpret an algorithmic probabilistic source as an algorithmic prob-
ability predictor. Given data sequence σ, the probability according to predictor QU
of bit b showing next is the conditional probability QU (b | σ) := QU (σb)QU (σ) .
Following the above intuition about data compression, the one-bit extension σb
with the greatest algorithmic probability QU (σb) among the two possibilities σ0 and
σ1 is the one that is the more compressible. Consequently, we see from the above
equation that QU (b | σ) is greatest for the b such that σb is the more compressible.
Hence, the algorithmic probability predictor QU will prefer the bit b that renders
the complete sequence σb more compressible. This is, in the words of Ortner and
Leitgeb (2011, 734), “evidently an implementation of Occam’s razor that identifies
simplicity with compressibility.”
The above reasoning applies to the algorithmic probability predictor QU for any
choice of universal Turing machine U . Since there are infinitely many universal
machines, we have an infinite class of algorithmic probability predictors. Let us
denote Q := {QU}U , the class of algorithmic probability predictors via all universal
machines U .
Thus, we have specified a class of predictorsQ that possess a distinctive simplicity-
qua-compressibility bias.
3.2. Step 2: The reliability of the predictor. The crucial result is that under
a “mild constraint” on the presupposed actual data-generating source S∗, we can
derive a precise constant upper bound on the total risk of the predictor QU .
The “mild constraint” on S∗ is that it is itself effective. It can be shown that
this property guarantees that we can represent S∗ in terms of the behavior of some
monotone machine M∗, which in turn can be emulated by the universal monotone
machine U . Then we can define a weight WU (S
∗) that is a measure of how easily
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U can emulate M∗, more precisely, how short the U -codes of M∗ are. This weight
gives the constant bound on QU ’s risk, as defined in Subsection 2.1.
Theorem 2 (Solomonoff 1978). For every effective data-generating probabilistic
source S∗, and for every universal monotone machine U ,
R(S∗, QU ) ≤ − log2WU (S∗).
A direct consequence of the constant bound on the total risk is that the pre-
dictions of QU must rapidly
7 converge, with S∗-probability 1, to the presupposed
actual probability values given by probabilistic source S∗. With S∗-probability 1,
we have that QU (b | Xt−1) t→∞−−−→ S∗(b | Xt−1).8
Let us more precisely define a predictor P to be reliable for S∗ if, with S∗-
probability 1, its predictions converge to the actual conditional S∗-probability val-
ues. Then, under the “mild constraint” of effectiveness of the actual source, the
predictor QU is reliable. It would motivate the conclusion that QU is reliable “in
essentially every case.”
3.3. The complete argument. Let me restate the full argument:
1. predictors in classQ possess a distinctive simplicity-qua-compressibility bias
2. predictors in class Q are reliable in essentially every case
∴ predictors that possess a simplicity-qua-compressibility bias are reliable in
essentially every case
Again, the conclusion of the argument asserts a connection between two seem-
ingly distinct properties of predictors: a preference for simplicity, and a general
reliability. The establishment of this connection between a simplicity preference
and a general reliability justifies the principle that a predictor should prefer sim-
plicity, the principle of Occam’s razor.
Note, however, that compared to the statement of the argument at the beginning
of this section, I have added a minor qualification to both of the steps. Both
qualifications are actually very much related; and spelling them out will show that
the two properties are not so distinct after all. At heart it is this fact that makes
the conclusion of the argument fail to justify Occam’s razor. In order to make all
of this explicit, I will now turn to the framework of Bayesian prediction.
7The type of convergence of Theorem 2, called convergence in mean sum to a constant by
Hutter (2003), lies between the type of convergence results that are silent about the rate of
convergence (like the merger-of-opinion results of Blackwell and Dubins, 1962 and Gaifman and
Snir, 1982) and the type of results that provide an explicit bound on the risk for the t-th prediction.
Convergence in mean sum to a constant is a fairly strong kind of convergence: common bounds on
the risk for the t-th prediction in results of the second type cannot guarantee a constant bound on
the total risk. This warrants speaking of “rapid” convergence. However, the bound of Theorem 2
becomes less surprising if one realizes that the class of possible effective data-generating sources
is only countable (as a result of effectiveness), whereas convergence results normally presuppose
uncountable hypothesis classes (cf. Solomonoff, 1978, 427; Li and Vita´nyi, 2008, 357-58).
8Strictly speaking, this probability-1-convergence can only hold for (and Theorem 2 is in the
literature only stated for) sources S∗ that are measures (see footnote 2). However, Theorem
2 and a suitably analogous convergence are straightforwardly obtained for the general case of
semimeasures.
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4. Bayesian Prediction
The topic of this section is Bayesian prediction, still in the setting of sequential
bit prediction. I will discuss the definition and interpretation of Bayesian predictors
(Subsection 4.1), their reliability property of consistency (Subsection 4.2), and the
special class of effective Bayesian predictors (Subsection 4.3).
4.1. Bayesian predictors. Bayesian prediction sets off with the selection of a
particular class S of probabilistic sources, that serves as our class of hypotheses.
(I will here restrict discussion to hypothesis classes that are countable.) Next, we
define a prior distribution (or weight function) W : S → [0, 1] over our hypothesis
class. The prior W is to assign a positive weight to the hypotheses and only the
hypotheses in S. An equally valid way of looking at things is that the definition
of a particular prior W induces a hypothesis class S, simply defined as the class of
hypotheses that receive positive prior. In any case, we have W (S) > 0⇔ S ∈ S.
Following Howson (2000); Romeijn (2004), the prior embodies our inductive as-
sumption. If induction, in our setting of sequential prediction, is the procedure
of extrapolating a pattern in the past to the future, then the lesson of the new
riddle of induction (Goodman, 1955; also see Stalker, 1994) is that there is actually
always a multitude of candidate patterns. One can therefore only perform induc-
tion relative to a particular pattern, or a hypothesis that represents a pattern that
we have seen in the past data and that we deem projectible in the future. From
a Bayesian perspective, the hypotheses that we give positive prior represent the
potential patterns in the data that we deem projectible; the other hypotheses, re-
ceiving prior 0, represent the patterns that we exclude from the outset. The great
merit of the Bayesian framework is that it locates our inductive assumption very
precisely, namely in the prior.
We are now in the position to define a Bayesian prediction method. It is a pre-
diction method that operates under the inductive assumption of the corresponding
prior W .
Definition 3. The Bayesian predictor PSW : B∗ → [0, 1] via prior W on countable
hypothesis class S is given by
PSW (σ) :=
∑
S∈S
W (S)S(σ).
Given data sequence σ, the probability according to PSW of bit b appearing next
is the conditional probability
PSW (b | σ) =
PSW (σb)
PSW (σ)
=
∑
S∈S
W (S | σ)S(b | σ).
4.2. The consistency of Bayesian predictors. To operate under a particular
inductive assumption means to predict well whenever the data stream under in-
vestigation follows a pattern that conforms to this inductive assumption. More
precisely, if a Bayesian predictor operates under a particular inductive assumption,
embodied by a prior over a particular hypothesis class S, it will predict well when-
ever some hypothesis S ∈ S fits the data stream well: whenever the data stream
is probable according to some S ∈ S. More precisely still, the predictor will from
some point on give high probability to each next element of a data stream whenever
there is some S ∈ S that has done and keeps on doing so.
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This property is closely related to the property of predicting well whenever the
data is in fact generated by some source S∗ ∈ S. If by “predicting well” we mean
converging (with probability 1) to the true conditional probabilities, then this is
again the property of reliability (Subsection 3.2).
We can prove that any Bayesian predictor, operating under the inductive as-
sumption of S, is reliable under the assumption that the data is indeed generated
by some source S∗ ∈ S. Indeed, we can derive a result completely parallel to The-
orem 2 on the total risk (as defined in Subsection 2.1) of the Bayesian predictors:9
Theorem 4. For every data-generating probabilistic source S∗ ∈ S, and for every
prior W on S,
R(S∗, PSW ) ≤ − log2W (S∗).
Again, this bound on the total risk of PSW entails its convergence to S
∗. For
every actual S∗ that is indeed member of the hypothesis class S, the predictions
of the Bayesian predictors PSW will converge with S
∗-probability 1 to the actual
probability values given by S∗. This is called the consistency property of Bayesian
predictors.
4.3. The effective Bayesian predictors. Recall that the second step of the ar-
gument for Occam’s razor relied on the “mild assumption” of effectiveness. This is
an inductive assumption. In the Bayesian framework, we can explicitly define the
class of predictors that operate under this inductive assumption.
Let Seff be the class of probabilistic sources that are effective. The inductive
assumption of effectiveness is expressed by any prior W that assigns positive weight
to the elements and only the elements of this class. If we moreover put the constraint
of effectiveness on the prior W itself, the resulting Bayesian mixture predictor PSeffW
will itself be effective. A predictor of this kind we call an effective Bayesian mixture
predictor, or effective mixture predictor for short.10
Definition 5. The effective Bayesian mixture predictor P effW : B∗ → [0, 1] via
effective prior W on Seff is given by
P effW (σ) := P
Seff
W (σ) =
∑
S∈Seff
W (S)S(σ).
Let R := {P effW }W denote the class of effective mixture predictors via all effective
priors W , that is, the class of all effective mixture predictors.
9This “folklore” result (see, for instance, Barron (1998)) could also be attributed to Solomonoff
(1978), as it follows from the exact same proof as the one for Theorem 2. See Poland and Hutter
(2005). Here, too, the qualification of footnote 8 applies.
10The class of effective sources (semicomputable semimeasures, see footnote 2) was first de-
scribed by Zvonkin and Levin (1970), although Solomonoff (1964) already indicated a mixture
over the class of computable measures. The shortcoming of the class of computable measures is
that it cannot be computably enumerated; consequently, a mixture predictor P
Scomp
W cannot be
effective. In contrast, the larger class Seff of semicomputable semimeasures can be enumerated,
and the mixture P
Seff
W is effective (as long as W is). (Since for measures, semicomputability al-
ready implies full computability, the weakening to semicomputability necessitates the weakening
to semimeasures.) This can be seen as the motivation for introducing the class of probabilis-
tic sources corresponding to the semicomputable semimeasures, rather than the seemingly more
natural class of computable measures.
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5. The Representation Theorem
This section is about Theorem 6 below. This theorem is a representation theo-
rem that forms the bridge between the algorithmic probability predictors and the
effective mixture predictors, and that is the key to defusing the argument to justify
Occam’s razor in Section 6.
Following the statement of the theorem in Subsection 5.1, I discuss how the theo-
rem illuminates a central theme surrounding Solomonoff’s algorithmic probabilistic
source, namely its claim to objectivity. I initiate this discussion in Subsection 5.2
on Solomonoff’s original motivation to define an objective-logical measure function
in the spirit of Carnap, and complete it in Subsection 5.3 on the correspondence
between the choice of universal machine and the choice of Bayesian effective prior.
Finally, Subsection 5.4 treats of the two directions of reading the theorem, in anal-
ogy to the original representation theorem of de Finetti.
5.1. The theorem. The crucial fact is that Definition 5 of the effective mixture
predictor is equivalent to Definition 1 of the algorithmic probability predictor. Re-
call that Q = {QU}U denotes the class of algorithmic probability predictors via all
universal monotone Turing machines U , and that R = {P effW }W denotes the class
of effective mixture predictors via all effective priors W . Then:
Theorem 6 (Wood, Sunehag, and Hutter, 2013). Q = R.
Thus every algorithmic probability predictor via some U is an effective mixture
predictor via some W , and vice versa.11
Among the philosophical fruits of Theorem 6 is the light it sheds on the discussion
about the element of subjectivity in the definition of the algorithmic probabilistic
source. I spell this out in Subsection 5.3; to prepare the ground I first discuss the
origin of Solomonoff’s work in Carnap’s early programme of inductive logic.
5.2. Algorithmic probability as an objective prior. Solomonoff makes ex-
plicit reference to Carnap (1950) when he sets out his aim in (1964, 2): “we want
c(a, T ), the degree of confirmation of the hypothesis that [bit] a will follow, given
the evidence that [bit sequence] T has just occurred. This corresponds to Carnap’s
probability1.” Solomonoff’s restriction of scope to what we have been calling se-
quential prediction aligns with Carnap’s position that “predictive inference is the
most important kind of inductive inference” (1950, 568), from which other kinds
may be construed as special cases. Carnap’s “singular predictive inference”, which
is “the most important special case of the predictive inference” (ibid.), concerns the
degree of confirmation bestowed upon the singular prediction that a new individual
c has property M by the evidence that s1 out of s individuals witnessed so far have
this property M . If we translate this information into a bit sequence by simply
writing ‘1’ at the i-th position for the i-th individual having property M (and ‘0’
otherwise), then we recover the problem of sequential prediction.12
11I should note that Theorem 6 is established by a fairly simple derivation, and even the authors
themselves consider it only a minor improvement on the well-known asymptotic equivalence of
the members of Q and R. The claim of this paper is that the theorem presents (the sharpest
expression of) a conceptually very significant fact about Solomonoff’s theory.
12Note that this translation presupposes a (temporal) ordering of individuals, which is some-
thing Carnap did not presuppose (1950, 62-64). This is an important deviation: for Solomonoff,
sequences 00001111 and 10101010 are different and should presumably confer different degrees of
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Solomonoff’s explication of degree of confirmation in our notation is the con-
ditional algorithmic probability QU (b | σ) = QU (σb)/QU (σ), analogous to a Car-
napian confirmation function c that is defined by c(h, e) := m(h | e) = m(h& e)/m(e)
for an underlying regular measure function m on sentences in a chosen monadic
predicate language. To Carnap, the value m(h) that equals the null confirmation
c0(h) of h is “the degree of confirmation of h before any factual information is
available” (1950, 308), which he allows might be called the “initial probability” or
“the probability a priori” of the sentence. Degree of confirmation is a “logical, se-
mantical concept” (ibid., 19), meaning that the value c(h, e) is established “merely
by a logical analysis of h and e and their relations” (ibid., 20), independent of any
empirical fact; and so the underlying null confirmation c0 also corresponds to “a
purely logical function for the argument h” (ibid., 308). Thus c0 is an objective prior
distribution on sentences, where its objectivity derives from its logicality (ibid., 43).
Likewise, Solomonoff seeks to assign “a priori probabilities” to sequences of sym-
bols; though the approach he takes is to “examine the manner in which these strings
might be produced by a universal Turing machine” (1964, 3), following an intuition
about objectivity deriving from computation. The resulting explication of the null
confirmation is the familiar algorithmic probabilistic source, that is indeed com-
monly referred to in the literature as the “universal a priori distribution” on the
finite bit sequences.
5.3. The element of subjectivity. However, if the algorithmic probabilistic source
is supposed to function as a “single probability distribution to use as the prior dis-
tribution in each different case” (Li and Vita´nyi, 2008, 347), then it starts to look
problematic that QU is not uniquely defined (cf. Solomonoff, 1986, 477; Hutter,
2007, 44-45).
The subjective choice of universal machine. The fact is that the definition of the
algorithmic probabilistic source retains an element of arbitrariness or subjectivity
in the choice of universal machine U .
There does exist an important Invariance Theorem to the effect that the shortest
descriptions via one universal machine U are not more than a fixed constant longer
than the shortest descriptions via another U ′. This implies that the probability
assignments of two algorithmic probability sources via different machines U and U ′
never differ more than a fixed factor, which in turn implies that any two different
QU and QU ′ converge to the same probability values as data sequences get longer:
QU and QU ′ are asymptotically equivalent. The Invariance Theorem is generally
taken to grant the definition of the algorithmic probability source a certain robust-
ness. Indeed, the formulation of this theorem, independently by Solomonoff (1964);
Kolmogorov (1965); Chaitin (1969), is considered to mark the birth of algorithmic
information theory. In Kolmogorov’s own words, “The basis discovery . . . lies in
the fact that the theory of algorithms enables us to limit this arbitrariness [of a
complexity measure that depends on a particular description method] by the de-
termination of a ‘complexity’ that is almost invariant” (Shiryaev, 1989, 921; also
see Li and Vita´nyi, 2008, 95-99; 192).
confirmation on the next bit being ‘1’; for Carnap both sentences, translated back, express the
same fact that four individuals in a sample of eight have property M .
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However, the constant factor that binds two different sources can still be arbitrar-
ily large. Nor does there appear to be a principled way to single out a “most natural”
or objective universal machine to define the algorithmic probabilistic source with.13
The shift to the subjective. Carnap himself, when he does propose in (1945; 1950) as
an explicatum of probability1 a confirmation function c
∗ based on a unique measure
function m∗, is careful not to make the claim that “c∗ is a perfectly adequate
explicatum of probability1, let alone that it is the only adequate one” (1950, 563);
and he indeed already in (1952) resorts to a continuum of confirmation functions cλ
parametrized by λ ∈ [0,∞]. Undeniably, “the selection of a particular value of λ to
uniquely determine a measure seems in the grand tradition of subjective theories
of probability” (Suppes, 2002, 198).14
The same can be said of the selection of a particular universal machine U to
uniquely define QU , but acceptance of this circumstance has been slow in the field:
“for quite some time I felt that the dependence of [the algorithmic probabilistic
source] on the reference machine was a serious flaw in the concept, and I tried
to find some ‘objective’ universal device, free from the arbitrariness of choosing a
particular universal machine” (Solomonoff, 2009, 9-10). Nevertheless, in his later
writings Solomonoff, too, turned away from the idea of a single most objective
universal machine, and came to embrace the choice of universal machine as an
inevitable and essentially subjective element of prior information in the definition
of the algorithmic probabilistic source (ibid., 9-11).
The subjective choice of effective prior. The subjective element that lies in the
choice of a specific universal machine is analogous to the subjective element in the
choice of a specific effective prior in a Bayesian mixture over effective hypotheses.
Note that the priors W and W ′ of any two Bayesian predictors P effW and P
eff
W ′ give
positive weight to each other, which again implies that their probability assignments
do not differ more than these weight factors; but, again, those weights may be
arbitrarily small. Moreover, like universal machines, some effective priors appear
more natural than others, and some complicated priors would probably look very
unnatural; but there does not appear to be a principled way to single out a most
natural or objective one.
A correspondence between the choice of universal machine and the choice of
Bayesian prior over effective hypotheses has been noted before, for instance by
Wallace (2005, 401-4). Theorem 6 tells us that the analogy between universal
monotone machines and effective priors over the effective probabilistic sources is in
fact an exact correspondence.
5.4. Reading the representation theorem. De Finetti’s celebrated representa-
tion theorem (1937) states (translated to our setting of sequential bit prediction)
the equivalence of a particular class of predictors, namely those that are exchange-
able (i.e., that assign the same probability to sequences with identical numbers of
0’s and 1’s), and a particular class of Bayesian mixtures, namely those densities over
13Mu¨ller (2010) presents an interesting attempt to isolate a machine-invariant version of al-
gorithmic probability. He concludes that “There is no way to get completely rid of machine-
dependence, neither in the approach of this paper nor in any similar but different approach”
(ibid., 126).
14Also see Jeffrey (1973, 302-03) for a brief and lucid evaluation of Carnap’s subjectivism, and
Zabell (2011, 301-05) for a more extensive overview of Carnap’s “shift to the subjective”.
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the independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) sources. Theorem 6 likewise
states the equivalence of a particular class of predictors, the class of algorithmic
probability predictors, and a particular class of Bayesian mixtures, the effective
mixtures over the effective sources.
For de Finetti, the significance of his result was that “the nebulous and unsat-
isfactory definition of ‘independent events with fixed but unknown probability’ ”
(142 in trans.), i.e., the notion of an underlying i.i.d. probabilistic source, could
be abandoned for a “simple condition of ‘symmetry’ in relation to our judgments
of probability” (ibid.), i.e., a property of our predictors. In the interpretation of
Hintikka (1971); Braithwaite (1957), talk of general hypotheses, problematic from
a strictly empiricist point of view, could be abandoned for constraints on methods
of prediction. An allied sentiment about the dispensability of general hypotheses is
expressed by Carnap (1950, 570-75), and is subsequently embraced by Solomonoff:
“I liked [Carnap’s confirmation function] that went directly from data to probabil-
ity distribution without explicitly considering various theories or ‘explanations’ of
the data” (1997, 76).
However, one could also reason the other way around (cf. Romeijn, 2004). Namely,
a representation theorem that relates a particular class of Bayesian mixtures and
a particular class of predictors, like de Finetti’s theorem or Theorem 6, shows that
this particular class of predictors operates under a particular inductive assump-
tion. This is the inductive assumption that is codified in the priors of the Bayesian
mixtures in this particular class: those patterns are assumed projectible that are
represented by hypotheses that receive nonzero prior. Thus de Finetti’s represen-
tation theorem shows that the exchangeable predictors operate under the inductive
assumption of an i.i.d. source; and Theorem 6 shows that the algorithmic proba-
bility predictors operate under the inductive assumption of an effective source. It
is essentially this insight that defuses the argument to justify Occam’s razor, as I
will show next.
6. Defusing the Argument
In this section, I recast (Subsection 6.1) and thereby defuse (Subsection 6.2) the
argument.
6.1. The argument recast. By Theorem 6, the following two formulations of step
1 of the argument to justify Occam’s razor are equivalent.
1. predictors in class Q possess a distinctive simplicity-qua-compressibility bias
1. predictors in class R operate under inductive assumption of effectiveness
Furthermore, since “in essentially every case” is to mean “under the assump-
tion of effectiveness of the actual data-generating source”, Theorem 2 about the
bound on the total risk of the algorithmic probability predictors QU is equivalent
to Theorem 4 about the consistency of the Bayesian predictors, applied to the class
of effective predictors P effW . Hence the following two formulations of step 2 are
equivalent.
2. predictors in class Q are reliable in essentially every case
2. predictors in class R are consistent
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If we make the property of consistency in step 2 explicit, the two steps of the
argument look as follows.
1. predictors in class R operate under inductive assumption of effectiveness
2. predictors in class R are reliable under assumption of effectiveness
Taken together, the two steps yield the conclusion that predictors that operate
under the inductive assumption of effectiveness are reliable under the assumption
of effectiveness.
6.2. The argument defused. In the original formulation, we define a class of
predictors with a distinctive simplicity bias that we can subsequently prove to be
reliable “in essentially every case”. This formulation suggests that we have estab-
lished a connection between two properties of a predictor that are quite distinct. We
got out a general reliability, whereas we put in a specific preference for simplicity.
This link between a simplicity bias and reliability provides an epistemic justification
of Occam’s razor, the principle that a predictor should have a simplicity bias.
The more explicit reformulation shows that the original formulation is mislead-
ing. We got out what we put in, after all. We define a class of predictors that
operate under the inductive assumption of effectiveness, that we can subsequently
prove to be reliable under the very same assumption of effectiveness.
Indeed, a renewed look at the simplicity bias described in Subsection 3.1 un-
veils the notion of simplicity involved as a peculiar one. The issue of subjectivity
(Subsection 5.3) concretely means that we can make any finite sequence arbitrar-
ily “simple” by an apt choice of universal Turing machine, which is the common
objection against the idea that algorithmic information theory can provide an ob-
jective quantification of the simplicity of finite sequences (cf. Kelly, 2008, 324-25).
Then this simplicity notion could only meaningfully apply to infinite data streams,
with an interpretation of “asymptotic compressibility by some machine,” or, equiv-
alently, “asymptotic goodness-of-fit of some effective hypothesis.” But this notion
as a property of a predictor is really the expression of a particular inductive as-
sumption (Subsection 4.2), the inductive assumption of effectiveness. The upshot
is that this property is certainly a simplicity notion in the weak sense in which any
inductive assumption can be seen as a specific simplicity stipulation (if only for the
plain reason that an assumption restricts possibilities); but it would require a whole
new argument to make plausible that the particular assumption of effectiveness is
somehow preferred in defining simplicity in this sense, or even gives a simplicity
notion in a stronger sense. And even if it could be argued that effectiveness yields
such a privileged simplicity notion, it is still not effectiveness (hence not simplicity
as such) that drives the connection to reliability: Theorem 4 tells us that, at least
for countable hypothesis classes, consistency holds for every inductive assumption
that we formalize in W .
The conclusion is that the argument fails to justify Occam’s razor.
7. Concluding Remarks
The central element of Solomonoff’s theory of prediction is the constraint or as-
sumption of effectiveness. This is clearly revealed by Theorem 6, that states that
Solomonoff’s algorithmic probability predictors are precisely the Bayesian predic-
tors operating under the inductive assumption of effectiveness.
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The argument to justify Occam’s razor does not work because the supposed
connection between a predictor’s simplicity preference and a predictor’s general
reliability, as forged by Theorem 2, is really the connection between a predictor’s
operating under a particular inductive assumption (effectiveness, in this case) and a
predictor’s reliability under this same assumption. This is an instance of Bayesian
consistency, that is quite irrespective of the particular assumption of effectiveness.
If there exists a way to salvage the argument at all, then it would have to consist
in demonstrating anew that effectiveness as an inductive assumption does lead to a
fundamental simplicity notion. Regardless of the feasibility of such an undertaking,
it would tie in with a more general project that certainly looks significant. This
project is the enquiry into the philosophical interest of the assumption of effective-
ness, particularly in the setting of sequential prediction – which, I submit, makes
for the philosophical interest of Solomonoff’s theory.
Now effectiveness does not appear very interesting in the naive shape of a con-
straint on possible data-generating sources, that is, as an assumption about pro-
cesses in the world. There seems little ground for promoting the notion of effec-
tiveness, an eminently epistemological notion that is to answer the epistemological
question of what we can possibly calculate, to a constraint on the world, a posi-
tively metaphysical constraint. Nor have decades of debate about “computability
in nature” uncovered support for such a move.15
However, the assumption of effectiveness does look very interesting in a different
shape. Namely, effectiveness seems much more natural as a restriction on our own
epistemic capabilities. In particular, it seems natural to say that all methods of
prediction we can possibly design must be effective (Subsection 2.2). If we accept
this, then it is possible to prove that the algorithmic probability predictor will come
to predict as well as any other predictor. That is, an algorithmic probability predic-
tor would represent the best we can do. This would render Solomonoff’s predictor
an idealized limit case of predicting at least as good as any member of a specific
class of competing predictors (namely, the limit case of the class of all predictors),
the central idea in the machine learning branch of universal prediction and the
philosophical proposal of meta-induction. Indeed, rather than in the tradition of
Carnap, addressing Hume’s problem of the justification of induction by insisting on
an objective starting point, this view of Solomonoff’s theory is closer to a pragmatic
approach to induction, going back to Reichenbach (1935).
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